It is well known that n bits of entropy are necessary and sufficient to perfectly encrypt n bits (one-time pad). Even if we allow the encryption to be approximate, the amount of entropy needed doesn't asymptotically change. However, this is not the case when we are encrypting quantum bits. For the perfect encryption of n quantum bits, 2n bits of entropy are necessary and sufficient (quantum one-time pad), but for approximate encryption one asymptotically needs only n bits of entropy. In this paper, we provide the optimal trade-off between the approximation measure and the amount of classical entropy used in the encryption of single quantum bits.
I Introduction
Secure transmission of information is a subject that has been studied extensively. In this model, Alice wants to securely transmit a message to Bob using a secret key that they both share, in such a way that any eavesdropper gets absolutely no information about the message sent. In the classical world, Shannon [11, 12] has shown that for the perfect encryption of n classical bits, it is necessary and sufficient to use n bits of classical entropy (one-time pad). By performing a bitwise XOR between the n-bit message and the n-bit secret key, the view of any eavesdropper that has no knowledge of the key is just a uniformly random n-bit string. Ambainis, Mosca, Tapp and de Wolf [2] showed that 2n classical bits of entropy are necessary and sufficient for the transmission of n quantum bits.
Let us briefly sketch how one can perfectly encrypt a quantum bit. Let ρ be the state of an arbitrary qubit and let I, X, Y, Z be the four Pauli matrices. Then, by using two bits of classical entropy we can uniformly pick one of the four matrices and apply it to our qubit. The state of the qubit after the encryption is
It's easy to verify that for all states ρ, E(ρ) = 1 2 I and hence the view of the eavesdropper is the completely mixed state, i.e. she gets no information about the encrypted state ρ. The scheme easily generalizes to n-qubit states by using 2n classical bits of entropy.
The entropy needed for the perfect encryption of quantum states is two times what is needed for the perfect encryption of classical bits. Interestingly, this is no longer true, when we look at approximate encryption. Let ρ ∈ C d×d be the state of a (log d)-qubit message, {U k ∈ C d×d |k ∈ [N ]} be a set of N unitary operations acting on log d qubits and D = {w 1 , . . . , w N } be a distribution on [N ] . Imagine the encryption scheme, where Alice picks a unitary U k with probability w k and applies it to the message. The ciphertext can be written as
w k U k ρU † k and the entropy of the scheme is defined as the Shannon entropy H(D).
of the scheme is H and for all states ρ
Similarly, the map E is a ( , H)-approximate encryption scheme for the 2-norm, if the entropy of the scheme is H and for all states ρ
Hayden, Leung, Shor and Winter [5] found an ( , n + o(n))-approximate encryption scheme for n qubits. Specifically, they showed that an encryption scheme that applies a unitary on ρ picked uniformly from a random set of unitaries of size 2 n+o(n) achieves -approximation. Ambainis and
Smith [3] derandomized this construction using small-bias sets and constructed deterministically a set of 2 n+o(n) unitaries that achieves an ( , n + o(n))-approximation for the 2-norm.
On the other hand, it is not hard to see that for the classical case, one needs at least n−log(1− 2 )
bits of entropy for an -approximation scheme. Hence, the entropy needed for the approximate encryption of classical and quantum states is asymptotically equal.
In this paper, we start by investigating the approximate encryption of single qubits and find the optimal trade-off between the approximation measure and the amount of classical entropy H,
i.e. we calculate the least amount of classical entropy which is necessary and sufficient to achieve an -approximation. Our proof is constructive in the sense that for any given we describe the encryption scheme that achieves the optimal H and vice versa. The following theorem holds both for the ∞-and 2-norm. Note the weights in the distributions are in decreasing order.
Theorem 1 Let E(ρ) be the optimal ( , H)-approximate encryption scheme for a qubit. Then, 1. The encryption is of the form E(ρ) = wρ + xXρX + yY ρY + zZρZ.
2. For any fixed , the optimal distribution D (and hence the minimum entropy H) is:
In Section II we find the optimal Pauli encryption scheme for a qubit and in Section III we show that Pauli encryption schemes are no worse than general encryption schemes.
Next, in Section IV we consider n-qubit encryption schemes which are a composition of independent single-qubit schemes that each use entropy H. In general, such questions are not easy to tackle, since they hinge on notoriously hard questions on the additivity of quantum channels.
However, in this case we only consider unitary operations and hence we can use a result of King [6] in order to find the optimal schemes.
Theorem 2 Let P be the single-qubit Pauli encryption scheme, which achieves the optimal approximation for the given entropy H. Then, the optimal n-qubit independent encryption scheme R(ρ)
is the same for both the 2-and the ∞-norm and has the following properties:
The above bounds are tight and hence for any encryption scheme that acts independently on each qubit, 2n − o(n) bits of entropy are necessary for approximate encryption.
Finally, in Section V we discuss non-independent n-qubit encryption schemes. In particular, we are interested in the Ambainis-Smith small-bias set based scheme. In [3] , they found a ( , n + o(n))-approximate encryption scheme for the 2-norm. Their scheme uses a deterministically constructed small-bias set of 2n-bit strings of size 2 n+o(n) , where each string corresponds to a unitary which is a tensor product of n Pauli matrices. The message is encrypted by picking uniformly a unitary from this set.
One of the open questions in their paper is whether this scheme is also an ( , n + o(n))-approximate encryption scheme for the ∞-norm. We resolve this by finding an example of an asymptotically optimal small-bias set, for which the encryption scheme of Ambainis-Smith fails in the ∞-norm. However, it is possible that an ( , n + o(n))-approximate encryption scheme for the ∞-norm can be constructed in a different way, for example by using a small-bias set with some extra properties.
II The Optimal Pauli Encryption Scheme
The input state to our encryption scheme is a quantum bit which can be described by a density matrix ρ, i.e. a hermitian matrix with unit trace
where r = (r x , r y , r z ) is a unit vector, and the four Pauli matrices are
Let us denote +1 eigenvectors of the matrices X, Y and Z by |x+ , |y+ and |z+ .
A Pauli encryption scheme for single qubits is described by a probability distribution on the four Pauli matrices, i.e. by a probability vector D = (w, x, y, z), such that the encryption of a qubit ρ is given by
Without loss of generality, we can assume the weights {w, x, y, z} obey w ≥ z ≥ x ≥ y ≥ 0.
The reason for this is that these four unitaries are freely interchangeable by picking a suitable ρ = U ρ U † . If the original qubit ρ was encoded by E(ρ), with weights {w, x, y, z}, we can achieve the same encoding E (ρ ) on the transformed qubit ρ , just with {w, x, y, z} permuted.
The classical entropy used by the encryption scheme is the entropy of the probability distribu-
To test how good the encryption scheme is, we want to know how much the encrypted state differs from the completely mixed state in the 2-and the operator norm. For any d-dimensional matrix A, the 2-and operator norm are related to the eigenvalues of the matrix, namely
Thus, for the operator norm we need to examine the maximum of the absolute value of the eigenvalues of
Note, that since the matrix I(ρ) has trace equal to 0, the two eigenvalues are of the form ±λ and hence, the 2-norm is maximized simultaneously with the operator norm.
II.1 The maximum eigenvalue of I(ρ)
After applying the channel (2) to the density matrix described by (1), we obtain
where the new parameters can be easily determined from (2) using the anticommutation relations for Pauli matrices.
This shows that the parameters r x , r y and r z shrink according to the above relations. The factors can be negative, but because have w ≥ z ≥ x ≥ y and w + z + x + y = 1, with a little work one can verify that the magnitude of the shrinking factor |2(w + z) − 1| in front of r z is the largest of the three.
Using the geometric description (1) of ρ, we can express the matrix I(ρ) as
Its eigenvalues are then simply
Our goal is to find the maximum eigenvalue |λ I(ρ) | over all states ρ as a function of the probability distribution D = (w, z, x, y) and then pick the distribution that minimizes it. Already knowing that the shrinking factor in front of r z is the largest, we can maximize |λ I(ρ) | = 
Note that w and z are the two largest weights and therefore we always have w + z ≥ 1 2 .
We thank the referees for pointing out a geometric view of the Pauli encoding in [8] , which simplified the proof in this section.
II.2 The optimal trade-off between approximation and entropy
In Section II.1, we found an upper bound on the maximum eigenvalue of I(ρ) as a function of the probability distribution used by the Pauli encryption scheme. Note also that equation (3) shows that for a perfect encryption the only possible scheme is the one that uses a uniform distribution over the four Pauli matrices.
The natural question is to find the optimal Pauli encryption scheme when we can only use a fixed amount H of classical entropy. Turning the question around, we fix the approximation parameter and calculate the necessary entropy to achieve it.
Let us fix = max ρ |λ| = w+z−1/2. In addition, the condition w ≥ z implies that 1/4+ /2 ≥ z.
Our goal is to minimize the classical entropy needed to achieve approximation :
Keeping x, y and fixed, the entropy as a function of z is concave, with a maximum at z = w.
Because z ≤ w, the entropy decreases with decreasing z. Specifically, if z > x + y, one can decrease the entropy by setting z = x + y (and increasing w accordingly, to keep fixed). Without loss of generality, one can then assume that z ≤ x + y for the optimal D. Now, let us minimize the entropy as a function of x. It is concave in x, with a maximum at x = y = (1 − w − z)/2 and possible minima at the endpoints. Because x ≥ y, we want to pick x as large as possible. Because x ≤ z and z ≤ x + y, this results in x = z. The weights that minimize the entropy for a fixed thus are (as a function of z)
To find the optimal H( ), one thus needs to minimize
with respect to z, remembering the constraints collected so far (w ≥ z ≥ x ≥ y ≥ 0, x + y ≥ z):
We perform this minimization in Appendix A.1 and conclude that for ≤ 1/6, picking the three larger weights to be equal is the entropy-minimizing strategy. For 1/6 ≤ ≤ 0 , picking only three unitaries, with two of the lower weights equal is the best choice. For 0 ≤ ≤ 1/2, it is optimal to pick the three smaller weights to be equal.
Turning the argument around -given entropy H, what is the optimal Pauli encryption scheme?
There is a unique way to pick the probability distribution with the given entropy that minimizes the parameter .
Note that the weights are in descending order and that the approximation is given by the sum of the largest two weights minus 1 2 . Also, one should not expect the optimal distribution parameters to be continuous at H 0 . These two ways of picking the weights come from different regions in the parameter space {w, z, x, y}, and the choice of the optimal distribution is simply a numerical minimum of these two functions. The point H 0 (or equivalently 0 ) does not have an obvious special meaning.
III The optimality of Pauli Encryption Schemes
In this section we give an elementary constructive proof that the Pauli encryption schemes are no worse than any general encryption scheme. For any encryption scheme
with arbitrary unitaries and weights, we give a Pauli encryption scheme with weights {w, z, x, y} that has lower entropy, and is no worse than E(ρ). We show this by finding a density matrix ρ 0 , for which the maximum eigenvalue of I(ρ 0 ) is the same as in (3), which is the worst case for the newly found Pauli scheme. Hence, the Pauli encryption scheme of section II is optimal amongst all possible encryption schemes.
After completion of this work, we learned of an alternative proof of optimality of Pauli encryption for a single qubit by Bouda and Ziman [4] . They investigated perfect encryption of a subspace of the Bloch sphere, while we are interested in approximate encryption of the whole Bloch sphere.
Their proof uses the Kraus representation of the quantum channel, showing that the representation of a channel using orthogonal matrices requires the least amount of entropy. We also thank the anonymous referee for providing us with another shorter proof. Using the fact that every channel Let T be an encryption scheme with distribution {w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w N } over N unitaries U k , where the weights are in decreasing order. We parametrize the unitaries as U k = e iα k e iφ k ( n k · σ) , where
The phases α k are not important in our analysis and hence, we denote the parametrization of U k only as U (φ k , n k ).
We have the following three cases:
We show that the entropy H of the encryption scheme T is greater or equal to 2, and for H = 2, we already know a perfect encoding with four unitaries and w k = 1/4. It is clear, that if w 1 < 1/4 then the entropy is larger than 2. Let us assume that w 1 ≥ 1/4. From the concavity of the Shannon entropy, we know that the entropy of a distribution that contains two weights (w k , w l ) with w k ≥ w l decreases if we change them into (w k + ∆, w l − ∆).
Hence we can decrease the entropy of the initial distribution {w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w N } by increasing the weight w 2 to make it equal to w 2 = 1/2 − w 1 and decreasing some of the smaller weights. We can further decrease the entropy by making the middle weights all equal, i.e {w 1 , w 2 , w 2 , . . . , w 2 , w N }.
Picking w 1 = x fully determines the distribution, giving w 2 = 1/2−x and w N = (4−N )/2+(N −3)x.
The constraints 1/2 ≥ w 1 ≥ w 2 ≥ w N ≥ 0 give us:
The entropy as a function of x is concave (the second derivative is negative) and therefore, we look for the minimum entropy at the endpoints, given in (7). These endpoints correspond to choosing the distribution as {w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w 2 } with w 2 = (1 − w 1 )/(N − 1). The entropy of such distributions as a function of N is
It's easy to see that this function is a monotone, growing function of N with a minimum for H(4) = 2. We conclude that any encryption scheme with n ≥ 5 unitaries and w 1 + w 2 − 1/2 < 0 uses entropy H ≥ 2 and hence is worse than the perfect encryption scheme with four unitaries.
Case 2: w 1 + w 2 − 1/2 ≥ 0 and
We show that there exists a Pauli encryption scheme that is no worse than T and uses less entropy. Let P be the Pauli scheme that uses the distribution {w 1 , w 2 , w 2 , w 3 }. This is possible by the constraint n k=3 w k ≤ 2w 2 and from the concavity of the entropy, P uses less entropy. We also know from equation (3) that for the encryption scheme P
Without loss of generality, when encoding an input density matrix ρ with the set of unitaries
one can equivalently analyze the encoding of the density matrix ρ = U † 1 ρU 1 with a related set of unitaries:
The approximation parameter of the encoding scheme is basis independent, it is now convenient to pick a basis in which the unitaries are of the form
where x 2 k + y 2 k + z 2 k = 1, and Z α 2 denotes a rotation about the z-axis, namely Z α 2 = e −iα 2 Z = (cos α 2 )I − i(sin α 2 )Z.
Let us now check how well the |z+ state is encoded.
Note that since ρ is an eigenstate of Z, it commutes with Z α 2 . After some algebraic manipulations we have:
where
The eigenvalues of I(ρ) are now
We know that w 1 + w 2 − 1/2 ≥ 0 and A k ≥ 0. Thus we can bound the eigenvalues as
with w 1 and w 2 the two largest weights. The equality is achieved if we pick our unitaries with z k = 0 and cos α k = 0, which imply
This is the same result as in equation (3) and hence no matter how we pick the unitaries, the encryption cannot be better than in the Pauli Encryption scheme.
Case 3: w 1 + w 2 − 1/2 ≥ 0 and n k=3 w k ≥ 2w 2 .
Since w 1 +w 2 ≥ 1/2, we conclude that w 1 ≥ 1/4 ≥ 1 3 (w 2 + n k=3 w k ) and so, it's possible to consider the Pauli scheme P that uses the distribution {w 1 ,
hence from the concavity of the entropy, P uses less entropy than T . From equation 3, we know that for the encryption scheme P
In what follows, we calculate how well the states |z+ , |x+ and |y+ are encrypted by T and prove that at least one of them is encoded worse than in the Pauli scheme P .
We pick the unitaries of T to be
Similarly to Case 2, the |z+ state is encoded no better than with
where we named z k = cos β k , x k = sin β k cos γ k and y k = sin β k sin γ k Let us now check how well the |x+ state is encoded.
where D k = (−1 + 2 cos 2 α k + 2 sin 2 α k sin 2 β k cos 2 γ k ) and C k , E k are functions of α k , β k , γ k which do not affect the bounds. The encoding of ρ x becomes
where F = w 1 − w 2 + 2w 2 cos 2 α 2 + k≥3 w k D k and G = w 2 sin 2α + k≥3 w k E k . We are ready to bound the eigenvalue:
Using the same type of computation as above, we encode the |y+ state and obtain a bound for the eigenvalues of I(ρ y ) = E(ρ y ) − I/2:
Summing the three inequalities of the eigenvalues, we obtain that
which implies that at least one of the three λ is greater or equal to (8) . This means the Pauli encryption scheme P is no worse than T , while using less entropy.
This concludes the proof that Pauli Encryption schemes are no worse than general encryption schemes. This also concludes the proof of Theorem 1.
IV N -qubit independent encryption schemes
In this section we consider n-qubit encryption schemes which are composed of independent singlequbit schemes, each using H amount of classical entropy 1 . By independent we mean that the encryption has the form R(ρ) = (R 1 ⊗ . . . ⊗ R n )(ρ).
Proof. We first employ a result by King [6] to show that product states are the worst encoded states for independent encryption schemes. King proved that the p-norm of a product of unital channels 2 is multiplicative, i.e. for p ≥ 1,
This shows that the norm R(ρ) p is maximized by a product state ρ = ξ 1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ξ n , where ξ i is the state of the i-th qubit. In our encryption schemes we measure the quality of the approximation by the maximum of the norm R(ρ) − I/2 n p , for p = 2 and p = ∞. Let λ k be the eigenvalues of R(ρ); then, the eigenvalues of R(ρ) − I/2 n are (λ k − 1/2 n ) and we have
1 For clarity of exposition, we assume that for each qubit we use the same amount of classical entropy. All the results go through in the more general case where for each qubit k we use entropy H k . 2 A quantum channel Φ is unital if it preserves unity, i.e. Φ(I) = I. The encryption schemes we consider here are unital. The p-norm of a channel R is the maximum of R(ρ) p over all input states ρ. Note that the multiplicativity of the p-norms, and hence the additivity of the capacities of non-unital channels is a main open question [13] .
therefore, for any independent encryption scheme the worst encoded state is a product state.
Hence, in order to find the optimal independent encryption scheme, one needs to find the scheme that encrypts product states optimally. The encryption of a product state R(
is also a product state and the eigenvalues of R(ξ 1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ξ n ) are simply products of the eigenvalues of R k (ξ k ). Without loss of generality, let us now encrypt a state ξ 1 ⊗ρ 2...n using R = R 1 ⊗ R 2...n . The eigenvalues of the single-qubit encryption R 1 (ξ 1 ) can be expressed as µ 1,2 = (1 ± 1 )/2 and the eigenvalues of R 2...n (ρ 2...n ) as ν k=1,...,2 n−1 = (1 + δ k )/2 n−1 . Hence, the eigenvalues and 2-norm of R(ξ 1 ⊗ ρ 2...n ) − I/2 n are
The last expression is a growing function of 1 and therefore, the optimal n-qubit encryption scheme has to be optimal (i.e. Pauli) on the first qubit, giving the smallest possible upper bound on 1 . After going through this procedure for all qubits, we see that the optimal encryption scheme for product states in the 2-norm is the Pauli scheme P ⊗n . It is straightforward to obtain the same statement for the ∞-norm using (12) . This concludes the proof that the optimal n-qubit independent encryption scheme for both the 2-and the operator norm is the Pauli scheme P ⊗n (ρ).
We now prove tight upper bounds for the quality of the approximation of the Pauli encryption scheme. For the 2-norm, equation (9) and induction imply
Let us pick ξ to be the worst encoded single-qubit state for P . The eigenvalues of P (ξ) are (1 ± )/2 and therefore:
From equation (10), we bound the 2-norm of P ⊗n (ρ) − I/2 n as
For the ∞-norm, multiplicativity of norms (9) implies
and therefore equation (11) gives us
Note that both bounds are tight and achieved for product states. 2
Since the bounds in Theorem 2 are tight, any good independent encryption scheme requires that the approximation parameter for each single qubit is = O( 
V General N -qubit Encryption Schemes
In the previous section, we found the optimal way to independently compose single-qubit encryption schemes in order to encrypt n-qubit states. However, one can do better with encryption schemes that do not act independently on each qubit. For example, the encryption scheme in [5] uniformly picks an n-qubit unitary from a set of O(n2 n ) random ones and hence it is not an independent encoding. Note also that it only uses n + log n + O(1) bits of entropy.
Ambainis and Smith ( [3] ) managed to derandomize the encryption scheme of [5] by explicitly describing the set of unitaries. In particular, they use a set of 2n-bit strings, where each string corresponds to a product of n Pauli matrices (the bits {2j − 1, 2j} define the Pauli matrix for the j-th qubit). They prove that if the set of strings is a small-bias set of size O(n2 n ), then picking a random unitary from this set gives an ( , n + 2 log n + 2 log 1 ) encryption scheme in the 2-norm.
A δ-biased set is a set of k-bit strings such that for all possible subsets of bits, the probability over the set that the parity of the subset is 0, is [
. Naor and Naor [7] gave the first such construction with size polynomial in k and 1/δ. Alon, Goldreich, Hastad and Peralta [1] showed a lower bound on the size of a δ-biased set
Since we are interested in encryption schemes which use less than 2n bits of entropy, we only consider δ-biased sets of size o(2 2n ) and hence δ = ω( 1 2 n ). Ambainis and Smith showed the following:
There exists a function δ(n) = ω( 1 2 n ) such that any O(δ(n))-biased set gives rise to a good encryption scheme in the 2-norm and moreover it has size N = o(2 2n ).
In fact, their result holds for any δ(n) = 1 α(n)2 n/2 , where α(n) is any slowly growing function of n (e.g. log n). Note, that there are explicit constructions of such small-bias sets of size N = poly(α(n), n)2 n .
However, it was an open question whether the same holds for the case of ∞-norm. Here, we resolve this question by providing a counterexample. We show that For any δ(n) = ω( The unitaries in the encryption scheme can be written as U k = U k 1 ⊗· · ·⊗U k n with U k i ∈ {I, X, Y, Z}.
For each unitary U k we define a string χ k ∈ {0, 1} n with χ k i = 0 if U k i ∈ {I, Z}, and χ k i = 1 if It is easy to see that starting from any small-bias set we can create a set which is asymptotically as good as the initial one and it has the extra property that it contains at least a δ(n) fraction of which means that the encryption scheme R is not good in the ∞-norm. In other words, we show that although a δ-biased set encryption scheme is always good for the 2-norm, this is not the case for the ∞-norm. However, it is still conceivable that one might be able to use δ-biased sets with some extra properties in order to achieve good encryption for the ∞-norm. 
